[December 26, 2024] There were so many Generals between III Corps and MNF-Iraq that it was hard for me to know who worked for who and, more importantly, who had the authority to direct our Engineers to do specific tasks. Every senior officer, it seemed, wanted us to do something – all of which made sense – but there were not enough of us to go around. This is the time when BG John McDonald came into my world.
I wasn’t planning on writing about specific individuals during our war in Iraq, but it’s necessary to get an idea of how and under what conditions that decisions are made. In this case, because BG McDonald is one of those kinds of people you can’t ignore, and with his outgoing and happy-go-lucky ways, I found him easy to work with on Engineering issues. His personality and unique way of thinking are worthy of some comment, which I will attempt to do justice to.
My boss had just returned from MNF-Iraq headquarters at the Al Faw Palace, visiting a new General recently assigned, BG McDonald. He came to see me to prepare for a brief on the construction effort housing TF Odin drones. At the time, much of the drone operation was classified, but it is now in the public domain. ODIN is an acronym standing for Observe, Detect, Identify, and Neutralize. In 2006, we were taking a beating from IED ambushes; that’s where TF Odin came into play.
Using the MQ-1B Predator, unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), we could keep In simplified terms, the UAV patrolled the roads and could attack a team of insurgents trying to install an IED. This would be a bad day for them. These were big UAVs with a wingspan of approximately 55 feet. The aircraft needed large rigid hangers to protect them from sun, sand, and wind. That’s where I came in.
BG McDonald’s problem was that there were no doors on the UAV hangers, and this needed to be solved. My boss had just returned from BG McDonald’s office, where he claimed that he had “just been chewed up by a General.” My boss did not have the answers BG McDonald needed, and this General wanted answers now, not tomorrow. My boss said, “If you go see McDonald, be fully prepared.”
Later that afternoon, I was called into BG McDonald’s office and asked why our Engineers had refused to put doors on the UAV hangers. I told him that the order had come directly from me. I thought he was going to blow his stack, looking at me like I’d countermanded his order.
I went on to explain that these hangers were considered Military Construction (MILCON) projects and, therefore, were at their Congressional limit as to how much money could be spent on them. This, I said, was based on U.S. law, not Army Regulations. If we wanted that changed, the process meant going to Congress, a difficult, long, but not impossible task. Then, I quoted the law, the line and the section (I’d looked it up earlier and memorized the information).
He said, “What are you? Some kind of smart guy?” I told him that it was my job to keep him and the Commanding General out of jail. Although this was technically true, it would certainly not be enforced. The Congressional limit is the limit, period. I would find a solution, but it needed two weeks. I called a large door manufacturer in the U.S. and got the donation of several doors. With the Air Force flying in the doors, the problem was now solved.
But that was not the end of the problem. The Battalion Commander of the TF had installed other doors in direct contradiction to BG McDonald’s orders. In the military, it’s not known to be to your advantage to disobey a direct order from a General. When I told BG McDonald about this, he was calm but looked at me and said, “Well, it’s time to go relieve that m****f***ing commander of his job.”
Before I left his office, he told me about his thoughts on the Iraqi peoples. Of course, I have my own views of the Iraqi people and I wrote about them eight years ago in a popular article (see link here). BG McDonald’s view is still interesting to me. This also gives us a good idea what is behind the fighting part of the war.
“Iraqis don’t care about democracy because they have only seen the dark side of democracy. They have seen violence, threats, less food, less electricity, and a weak government unable to get a handle on the situation. Iraqis want a strong government to fix the problem and they don’t care what type – democratic, dictatorial, or whatever. They want the criminal and insurgency hit hard and held down so,they can get about their regular lives. They do,prefer to live where they don’t have to worry about things like food and electricity. The Socialist system gives them these things.” — BG McDonald, December 26, 2016, Al Faw Palace, Baghdad, Iraq (from personal notes)
The next day, I would brief LTG Raymond Odierno, the III Corps (MNC- Iraq) Commander on the Coalition’s ability to take on short-notice construction projects (like TF Odin) and development of “surge” infrastructure. Unknown to me at the time, I was about to be directed to turn around our entire Coalition Engineer efforts. That would be a challenge unlike any thing I’d ever done.
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It’s great to get the insight into the decision making for the surge.
Good, we are getting into parts of the war leading up to the surge. From what I’ve read so far, it looks obvious that something big is coming.
So much of this war could have been avoided if Saddam Hussein was not so narcissistic. So sad for the thousands that died on both sides. Saddam ruled with an iron fist and in the end he was hung from the gallows for his crimes against his own people.
Jeremiah, I was not at his hanging but I was in Baghdad. We were on standby in case there was an outbreak in violence to support the Iraqi Police and Army. I remember that day well.
I can appreciate BG McDonald’s take on the Iraqi people. He sees them as very pragmatic. In contrast to you, Gen. Satterfield who sees them as more visionary as to what Iraq could potentially become. Looking back now, 18 years, it looks like both of you got parts right and wrong.
INTERESTING, VERY INTERESTING
Yes, indeed. There has been more written recently on those activities before the surge began in earnest. LTG Ray Odierno started implementing the new strategy before surge troops began arriving. GEN Casey, as I understand it, didn’t appreciate early military strategy changes. GEN Petraeus would not replace Casey for a couple more months.
At different times during the past decade that Gen. Satterfield has been writing in his blog, he mentioned that this was the most challenging time of his career. We are about to see this come about in his own words. To quote, “ The next day, I would brief LTG Raymond Odierno, the III Corps (MNC- Iraq) Commander on the Coalition’s ability to take on short-notice construction projects (like TF Odin) and development of “surge” infrastructure. Unknown to me at the time, I was about to be directed to turn around our entire Coalition Engineer efforts. That would be a challenge unlike any thing I’d ever done.” — Gen. Satterfield. I’ll say that this last sentence of this blog post sums it up pretty nicely.
A difficult time for our soldiers. God bless them all.
We are about to be amazed. How can Gen. Satterfield have such detailed recall of events?
Eva, did you note that at the end of the BG McDonald quote that it was written “(from personal notes)”? I believe that Gen. Satterfield said he kept notes in booklet format during his time in combat.
Good memory, Doc. Here it is: “ 5 Lessons Learned from my First Combat”
https://www.theleadermaker.com/5-lessons-learned-from-my-first-combat/
“ [June 25, 2021] Flipping through an old notebook that I carried with me in the war with Iraq, I came across several lessons I learned from combat, mostly learned the hard way. “ — Gen. Doug Satterfield, first sentence.
Yes!! One of my favorite articles from the past.
Wow ….
Iraqis don’t care about democracy because they have only seen the dark side of democracy.
This is scary. This BG McDonald has a way to express what is likely true but I’m not so sure based on other historical writings.
Gen. Satterfield, I want to thank you for this series on what you refer to as the “pre-surge.” This is an important education, especially as we were on the home front watching the war from afar. Much of the news at the time, should I say always, was heavily biased. True journalism died many years ago and will be and hasn’t recovered unfortunately. Today, we see this continuing downward tend in qualitative reporting n I see no end in the direction until they are bankrupt and that won’t happen until Americans wake up and demand the truth in place of lies.
King Henry XVIII (nice moniker BTW), thank you for that thoughtful repossessed. I am not so sure we want to revisit this history or t should be written into textbooks for those who specialize in this level of discipline. What happened, happened. We lost the war. We should have never been there in the first place.
Commie, I want to disagree with you. It is never too late to get our history right. And there are many, mostly weak political Leftists who strongly want to change what really happened, good or bad. This is the socialist way. And it is not a good way to make ourselves better. I do agree with you in part that maybe, just maybe, we should not have started this war. But that is a different debate for another time. Please don’t mix them together. Thanks.
Commie Red, I think you are headed in the wrong direction we should take apart this part of the war to better understand it. This is not easy but to accept the media lies and just let it go is, frankly, unacceptable.
Well said, King Henry. I’m hoping we can drill down into the decision-making process. That would be a great learning experience. 👍