[March 15, 2025] By early February of 2007, we were in the throes of intense planning for the pending Surge. My work week was non-stop meetings, briefings, development of new Surge sites, construction paperwork, and the typical daily grind of staff work. Fortunately, I was in excellent physical shape, except I had damaged my right knee while running. The Army doctor said I had torn my ACL, but later, it was determined to be a torn meniscus. Running was off the table and sad for me since that was my most efficient way of staying in top physical condition. Now, I would walk and lift weights, which would take longer.
Based on General O’s guidance, I began to look beyond Baghdad to find homes for larger BCTs. To the east, there was an old Iraqi Army base where their 50th Republican Guard Armored Brigade had been located before we destroyed it. And I was asked to increase my level of help for TF-130, the unit responsible for Detainee Operations. These would be two major efforts in our plan to be ready for an increase in combat power to bring the violence down in Iraq. Baghdad, being in a strategic location of two major rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, became the point at which the insurgency and terrorists would put their main effort.
This meant the Surge in U.S. Army units would eventually go there. My job was to give General O as many options as possible, meaning I had to see and evaluate all the sites where it was possible to place a BCT. It also had to have a road network from that location that could allow movement to Baghdad in support of the main fight. The first location outside Baghdad I considered was Butler Range. This was the old 50th Armored location and was about 50 miles east of Baghdad. For some reason, I don’t know; the U.S. Marines had a small element there. I have no idea what they did, but the location was perfect. I needed that base.
Butler Range was a terrible base in a great location. The U.S. Air Force – and I love those guys – had destroyed Butler Range in the early part of the war by flattening every building but two. Looking at the base, we needed to know if we could get support from KBR, running logistics between Butler Range and our main supply point in Baghdad. My initial thought was that this could be a good U.S. Division HQ location but I later rejected that idea for a more centralized location. General Casey was now quizzing General O about where base construction would take place in relation to the campaign plan and when. I could see General O was under pressure to lock down locations to base the incoming firepower.
In February, I traveled to Butler Range by convoy to do an in-person reconnaissance of the base and surrounding area. I took several of my MNC-I Engineers. Since the base was so far from the river, the area was dry. If we were to use this location we needed water and needed it fast. I sent my guys looking for it while I met with a USMC major in charge. After a drive through the area, I was amazed and surprised by the extent of damage and the large amount of unexploded ordnance (UXO) lying out in the open. “Sir, watch where you step.” I didn’t need to be told to be careful. This project was going to be a dirty, dangerous job for Engineers. On the hood of a HUMMV, the Marine major and I drew out the limits of the incoming yet unidentified BCT that would be based here.
Working with TF-130 was a challenge because their commander was a “nut.” Actually, I thought he had gone mad from the pressure, but he was later promoted, so he survived. He wanted an expansion of several existing detainee camps. The largest camp we controlled was in southern Iraq at Bucca. I flew down there on February 7 for an on-the-ground reconnaissance to get an idea of how the camp was run and their infrastructure problems, like sewage disposal and prison overcrowding. While being briefed before I left, TF-130 staff gave me their plan. Part of their brief was a tiny graph showing a projected increase in prisoner population over time. When I asked how they came up with that estimate, they were quiet. It was a guess. I told them that if I were ever called before the U.S. Congress to testify about spending millions of dollars based on a tiny, unsubstantiated graph, I would be doing some name-dropping. I couldn’t agree with their analysis.
Like any major project being planned, designed, built, and maintained in a compressed timeline, mistakes will be made. Therefore, I had all these bases overbuilt. Extra capacity was built in whenever possible. I’d learned in my first combat tour that whatever assumptions I was told to use would inevitably be wrong. At Bucca, I spoke to the Navy Lieutenant in charge of their SEABEEs, a renowned Navy organization, to get an idea of what I could expect. The first thing he told us was they were “not allowed to go outside the wire.” This was ridiculous. Whoever heard of this? I would take this up with his commander in Kuwait, a female Navy Captain (O-6). She told me the same thing. My comment went something like this, “You will order your SEABEEs to push the berm (outer perimeter) outward from the inside, and that way, they never have to go outside the wire.” She declined. I told her that her next phone call would be from GEN Casey, relieving her of command. She consented to my “request.”
There were hundreds of major engineering projects starting up and ongoing that took a hands-on approach. For example, we had already identified a number of upper respiratory infections from the dust kicked up in our bases. The MNC-I Surgeon told me he thought a combination of dust and smoke from burning garbage caused the infections. This is why we began an incinerator program. We couldn’t buy them and install them fast enough. Around this time, I was flying or traveling by convoy to a number of smaller bases to determine how many Surge units could go there. While we were planning on five BCTs, that number kept changing.
GEN David Petraeus took command of MNF-I on February 10. From him, I would find out that the 3rd Infantry Division HQ would be the command over the Surge troops. This meant I could now get time to discuss construction with their commanders over a classified VTC. I was having regular meetings with the KBR top man, Guy Laboa, to ensure they would be ready to support the incoming Surge under the LOGCAP IV contract. I was also helping MNSTC-I, an American training-support element to bring the Iraqi Army and Police up to full mission readiness. I knew most of their Colonels and remained in touch, learning about their problems and occasionally lending some technical assistance.
MNF-I Resource and Sustainment (R&S) was a huge help. Colonel Mary Whitworth, a loggie with tremendous skill, helped me get approval for a Force Provider package for Butler Range. I’d never even seen one before, only read about them. This is a bare-base support system of various tents with equipment, all stored in large CONEX containers. We would eventually use several of these packages, but only after the U.S. Defense Logistics Agency relented. We were initially denied because they were classified as “strategic war stock.” Well, we were at war. The actual deployment of the Force Provider at Butler Range is a story in itself and should be told someday.
Some folks say they want an easy lifestyle. Not me. I want to be in the game, not watching from the sideline. I always wanted to be the man in the arena. Being in charge of construction for incoming Surge troops was the most difficult, dangerous, and inspirational time of my life. I loved it.
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Frankie Boy made a great comment below, I recommend you read it. The gist of his comment is that most of the history of the Iraq War and much of what we hear about it comes from a bunch of pussy, limp-wristed, pantywaisted professors who are scared of their shadows and if they had to actually fight in a war, the first thing they would do is piss their pants and run away like the real cowards they are. They sit back and pontificate on things they know zero about. I would say, they know less than zero because what they think they know is wrong. I’m glad I never had a history class by the fools who are “Doktors” at a university. 🇺🇸🇺🇸🇺🇸🇺🇸🇺🇸🇺🇸🇺🇸🇺🇸🇺🇸🇺🇸
Looks like this is going to be a long series about the inside decisions that made our war in Iraq successful. I say that, despite the whacko leftists who always insist we are losing and becoming a dictatorship. These Marxists are just haters and suck off the tit of our society without making any meaningful contributions. They are mentally sick in the head. I’d hate to be them
Ha Ha Ha ==. good one, Martin.
Martin is always thinking and good for him. What I think he is saying is that we can look forward to a series that educates and entertains us. We will be learning that being a senior leader is not all excitement and flowers but often drudging, hard work that takes someone who can lead a team of professionals and accomplish the mission with minimal problems. This will be another great read. So, sit back, get ready, and learn what it’s like to deal with complex issues on a daily basis.
This is going to be a wonderful series. From one Vet to another, thank you.
🇺🇸Thank you for your service!🇺🇸
YEAH, more in this important series on the pre-Surge days of 2007. I can’t wait to the next article. Yeah, you might think this is boring because there is no “kicking in doors” and “taking names” but I love it. You get to be there with Gen. Satterfield and fixing the many problems and solving how to house 30,000 people in just a few months.
Good job laying this out for us. Please create a tab, like you did for your series “Letters to My Granddaughter.” This will help us read the entire series easily. Thanks.
Good idea.
Thanks, Gen. Satterfield. I’ve written this before under this series of yours on the pre-Surge effort in the Iraq War, but it needs repeating, we need to take back the woke military and turn it back to warfighting. Gen. S. Is one of the real warfighters. Kick out the DEI hires and get back to basics. He is showing us how real Engineers are doing the hard job of preparing the battlefield before the fight.
Force Provider details by DLA – https://www.dsp.dla.mil/Portals/26/Documents/Programs/JointStandardizationBoards/JSB-ESBE/Army/Force%20Provider/Expeditionary/20210209%20-%20PM_FSS_Factbook_010419_FP_Pages.pdf
Since there has been, over the past decade, many art and books on the “Surge” and the battles fought – all that really cool stuff – it is finally good to get a little insight from someone who was part of the preparation, planning, thinking, about how to put this all together. We need that. Our senior leaders need to get this idea that it takes all sorts of hard work to be fully prepared to conduct a successful military campaign. We now get to read about how the Engineers were a key part in this effort. Much thanks to Gen. Satterfield for laying this out for us. Now, it’s hard to now think this was back in 2007, so long ago.
Eric, so true. I hope folks are paying attention. Gen. Satterfield is doing us a favor by laying out an impopart of our military history.
True, Fred. That’s why I’m such a huge, huge, huge fan of this leadership blog.
This is why Gen. Satterfield’s blog is my go-to-site for the real history of the Iraq War and not some armchair, ivy league, know nothing professor who gets his feelings hurt when someone mis-genders him/her/zer!
I’m looking at my friends who served there during the Surge and while they thought their tents were too small, they were happy they had heat and ac, and power. For those in the middle of the fight, all those small things matter more than most of us can ever imagine.
Wow, bringing back some old memories. Thank you, sir.