Iraq War Pre-Surge: Butler and Bucca 

[March 15, 2025]  By early February of 2007, we were in the throes of intense planning for the pending Surge. My work week was non-stop meetings, briefings, development of new Surge sites, construction paperwork, and the typical daily grind of staff work. Fortunately, I was in excellent physical shape, except I had damaged my right knee while running. The Army doctor said I had torn my ACL, but later, it was determined to be a torn meniscus.  Running was off the table and sad for me since that was my most efficient way of staying in top physical condition. Now, I would walk and lift weights, which would take longer.

Based on General O’s guidance, I began to look beyond Baghdad to find homes for larger BCTs. To the east, there was an old Iraqi Army base where their 50th Republican Guard Armored Brigade had been located before we destroyed it. And I was asked to increase my level of help for TF-130, the unit responsible for Detainee Operations. These would be two major efforts in our plan to be ready for an increase in combat power to bring the violence down in Iraq. Baghdad, being in a strategic location of two major rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, became the point at which the insurgency and terrorists would put their main effort.

This meant the Surge in U.S. Army units would eventually go there. My job was to give General O as many options as possible, meaning I had to see and evaluate all the sites where it was possible to place a BCT. It also had to have a road network from that location that could allow movement to Baghdad in support of the main fight. The first location outside Baghdad I considered was Butler Range.  This was the old 50th Armored location and was about 50 miles east of Baghdad. For some reason, I don’t know; the U.S. Marines had a small element there. I have no idea what they did, but the location was perfect. I needed that base.

Butler Range was a terrible base in a great location. The U.S. Air Force – and I love those guys – had destroyed Butler Range in the early part of the war by flattening every building but two. Looking at the base, we needed to know if we could get support from KBR, running logistics between Butler Range and our main supply point in Baghdad. My initial thought was that this could be a good U.S. Division HQ location but I later rejected that idea for a more centralized location.  General Casey was now quizzing General O about where base construction would take place in relation to the campaign plan and when. I could see General O was under pressure to lock down locations to base the incoming firepower.

In February, I traveled to Butler Range by convoy to do an in-person reconnaissance of the base and surrounding area. I took several of my MNC-I Engineers. Since the base was so far from the river, the area was dry. If we were to use this location we needed water and needed it fast. I sent my guys looking for it while I met with a USMC major in charge. After a drive through the area, I was amazed and surprised by the extent of damage and the large amount of unexploded ordnance (UXO) lying out in the open. “Sir, watch where you step.”  I didn’t need to be told to be careful. This project was going to be a dirty, dangerous job for Engineers. On the hood of a HUMMV, the Marine major and I drew out the limits of the incoming yet unidentified BCT that would be based here.

Working with TF-130 was a challenge because their commander was a “nut.”  Actually, I thought he had gone mad from the pressure, but he was later promoted, so he survived. He wanted an expansion of several existing detainee camps. The largest camp we controlled was in southern Iraq at Bucca. I flew down there on February 7 for an on-the-ground reconnaissance to get an idea of how the camp was run and their infrastructure problems, like sewage disposal and prison overcrowding. While being briefed before I left, TF-130 staff gave me their plan. Part of their brief was a tiny graph showing a projected increase in prisoner population over time. When I asked how they came up with that estimate, they were quiet. It was a guess. I told them that if I were ever called before the U.S. Congress to testify about spending millions of dollars based on a tiny, unsubstantiated graph, I would be doing some name-dropping. I couldn’t agree with their analysis.

Like any major project being planned, designed, built, and maintained in a compressed timeline, mistakes will be made. Therefore, I had all these bases overbuilt. Extra capacity was built in whenever possible. I’d learned in my first combat tour that whatever assumptions I was told to use would inevitably be wrong. At Bucca, I spoke to the Navy Lieutenant in charge of their SEABEEs, a renowned Navy organization, to get an idea of what I could expect. The first thing he told us was they were “not allowed to go outside the wire.”  This was ridiculous. Whoever heard of this?  I would take this up with his commander in Kuwait, a female Navy Captain (O-6). She told me the same thing. My comment went something like this, “You will order your SEABEEs to push the berm (outer perimeter) outward from the inside, and that way, they never have to go outside the wire.”  She declined. I told her that her next phone call would be from GEN Casey, relieving her of command. She consented to my “request.”

There were hundreds of major engineering projects starting up and ongoing that took a hands-on approach. For example, we had already identified a number of upper respiratory infections from the dust kicked up in our bases. The MNC-I Surgeon told me he thought a combination of dust and smoke from burning garbage caused the infections. This is why we began an incinerator program. We couldn’t buy them and install them fast enough. Around this time, I was flying or traveling by convoy to a number of smaller bases to determine how many Surge units could go there. While we were planning on five BCTs, that number kept changing.

GEN David Petraeus took command of MNF-I on February 10. From him, I would find out that the 3rd Infantry Division HQ would be the command over the Surge troops. This meant I could now get time to discuss construction with their commanders over a classified VTC. I was having regular meetings with the KBR top man, Guy Laboa, to ensure they would be ready to support the incoming Surge under the LOGCAP IV contract. I was also helping MNSTC-I, an American training-support element to bring the Iraqi Army and Police up to full mission readiness. I knew most of their Colonels and remained in touch, learning about their problems and occasionally lending some technical assistance.

MNF-I Resource and Sustainment (R&S) was a huge help. Colonel Mary Whitworth, a loggie with tremendous skill, helped me get approval for a Force Provider package for Butler Range. I’d never even seen one before, only read about them. This is a bare-base support system of various tents with equipment, all stored in large CONEX containers. We would eventually use several of these packages, but only after the U.S. Defense Logistics Agency relented. We were initially denied because they were classified as “strategic war stock.”  Well, we were at war. The actual deployment of the Force Provider at Butler Range is a story in itself and should be told someday.

Some folks say they want an easy lifestyle. Not me. I want to be in the game, not watching from the sideline. I always wanted to be the man in the arena. Being in charge of construction for incoming Surge troops was the most difficult, dangerous, and inspirational time of my life. I loved it.

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Please read my books:

1. “55 Rules for a Good Life,” on Amazon (link here).
2. “Our Longest Year in Iraq,” on Amazon (link here).