Iraq War Pre-Surge: Force Protection 

[March 22, 2025]  As I look back upon those times we were planning and building in preparation to receive the great Surge, I am surprised our Engineers were not attacked while convoying. I suppose luck played a part, as it will do during combat, but there is never an excuse to unnecessarily expose your troops to enemy action. We did actively protect our Engineers while moving about the battlefield. This was done in two ways. The first was standard convoy active measures like direct fire weapons, planned routes outside hot zones, and dedicated gun trucks. The second way was to be capable of reaching a more lethal quick reaction force (Army Aviation or Combat TFs).

We were still working at the Butler Range (Besmaya). Unlike other locations we were using wells and surface water sources that contained a high saline content. The distance and less-than-good road network were a problem in transporting equipment, personnel, and supplies (like water, fuel, and food) to and from Baghdad. Protection of the Butler Range base was paramount and would need extra layers of defense given that it was located within sight of a known insurgent stronghold. This enemy area was co-located with a huge Iraqi brick production site, which I wanted to visit but was persuaded not to by the local U.S. Marines. We would use an Air Force REDHORSE unit, commanded by LTC Garner, to be the main Engineer effort; the first major project they would conduct and the first time I’d worked with this kind of unit.

On 9 February, I would be introduced to BG Ed Cardone, the 3ID Assistant Division Commander for Support (ADC-S).  The more engaged our Engineers became involved in preparing for the Surge, the more senior officers I needed to engage for coordination and information flow. This was also the date GEN Petraeus informed me that the 3ID would not come with “enablers.”  Enablers were units responsible for Intelligence, Reconnaissance, Artillery, etc. The arriving Surge unit designations, numbers and types of equipment, arrival times, command and control information and the timeline (minus enablers) were classified Top Secret. It would be our job to translate the needed TS requirements into detailed, unclassified plans for our contractors to build while not giving away vital, classified information. BG Cardone would be of great help to us.

COL Volesky, working at MNF-I (who I’d worked with in my first Iraq War tour) was interested in ensuring our Engineers had adequate Force Protection. We appreciated his help as a combat  Infantry officer with experience with enemy insurgents in the Baghdad AO.  He would also help me get the number and type of incoming troops by Battalion and by Brigade HQ so we could ensure we had the construction right-sized.  Of course, the C-7 Engineers were still working on Overhead Cover, generator farm expansion, Incinerators, the Baghdad Bypass, LOGCAP change from III to IV, C-7 staff Engineer shortages, fuel and water farms, and all the support necessary to properly augment the Surge.

I found that a good way of getting to know key senior military and civilian personnel in this combat zone was to schedule a breakfast meeting. We had to eat regular balanced meals anyway, and a good breakfast always seemed to be the ideal way to sort through what these officers (and sometimes senior NCOs) did and how they might help.  It was not unusual that these officers were active duty, reserve, and National Guard. Some were from other nations, English speakers from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, or the UK. If they had been sent to us, they would have been working in MNF-I and would have been highly effective at their jobs. I discovered them all to be honest and straight shooters. What I liked most about the reservists and National Guard officers, as they were also professional civilians, was that they often knew people back in their country of origin who could lend us assistance.

Unfortunately, I was still fighting rules and regulations where we were required to adhere to peacetime regulations during combat.  The biggest fight for me was with Military Construction (MILCON), a Congressionally authorized and appropriated project where funds are obligated for five years. Construction in a combat zone cannot work on such a lengthy timeline plus, even more difficult, the cost limits made planning a very frustrating process. We had fights over what was the definition of a “project” and the lengthy, convoluted, complex process. And while we were able to compress the times greatly, they were still too long. On more than a few occasions, I joked that I had to have a contract JAG officer attached to my hip.

The earliest Surge unit to arrive would be 3/3 (3rd BCT, 3rd ID), and it was planned for Butler Range. The environment was “austere,” a word I’d use often, much to the consternation of senior commanders. I did promise that we would be improving the unit’s QOL (quality of life) by fabricating a PX, a medical clinic, better physical structures (getting rid of the Force Provider), improved safety through better force protection, an incinerator, a water plant, and a power distribution system for more reliable electricity. 3/3 was to arrive on 27 March, a little over six weeks away. MNC-I senior staff would hold a classified VTC weekly to keep 3ID informed.

On 17 February, I did a recon of “Area 51,” about two kilometers from our C-7 HQ building. Inside the area was a scattering of buildings that had been taken over “without permission” being received from the Victory Base mayor. One large building – 51F – was a good size to turn into a Division HQ, and so I gave all the Soldiers bivouacking 24 hours to get out. We sent in our Engineers immediately to begin stripping out everything in preparation for turning it over to 3ID. Inside the structure was old machinery for printing. Rumors said the printing press was to print money. This would be a problem because of building-use change and the associated costs; the old peacetime rules in a wartime environment problem. I classified the structure as “light industrial” and made the change of use easy.

COL Toby Green, the G-3 Operations Officer—a tough but fair officer—was concerned that MND-Baghdad would not provide the required security to our Engineers at Butler Range or as we traveled about with our heavy equipment. The issue remained a concern for us throughout much of late February. Butler Range was important and a priority, but we had four more brigades inbound. One would be an Aviation Brigade and would go north to Taji.

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Please read my books:

1. “55 Rules for a Good Life,” on Amazon (link here).
2. “Our Longest Year in Iraq,” on Amazon (link here).