Iraq War Pre-Surge: Helicopter Down

[February 21, 2025]  The day begins badly. It’s Sunday, January 21st; we begin our day attending a memorial service for an Engineer Soldier killed in the line of duty. I sit in a row of chairs reserved for Colonels and Sergeant Majors, front row. Oddly, beside me is an empty chair with COL White’s name affixed. He is the National Guard liaison. It’s not like him to miss a local memorial service. After returning to my duties at the “Boathouse,” I was informed that he was on a Blackhawk helicopter that was shot down returning to our base; all hands lost.  I knew five of the 12 Soldiers killed that day, and I would also later attend their memorial services.

It’s easy to count the dead and wounded when you either don’t know them personally or when you have no skin in the game (of providing security for the people of Iraq).  Many back home, and a number of Democrat politicians, threatened to shut down our efforts and made their positions known by verbal attacks on our troops. This is a classic Liberal method to hold onto political power, and I find it disgraceful and disrespectful. However, for those of us in Iraq, the degenerate behavior we saw was minor when compared to the gross contempt shown to our Vietnam War veterans. To this day, I stand proud of those veterans and always thank them and say, “Welcome home.”

Today, we continued our planning for the Surge. Part of that planning was oversight of our military reduction of outlying bases. We had been withdrawing from those bases, and we did not stop that effort. Initially, I was confused about that effort, but it made sense in a way. U.S. troops were concentrating on larger bases while the Iraqi Army and their Police were filling in behind us in those bases. By doing this, the Iraqi government was taking on a greater role in their own security and also building up a culture of maintaining security for all their people, based on their citizenship, and not based on tribal affiliation.

We were moving fast to meet General O’s orders to prepare to receive five BCTs and a Division Headquarters. To do so meant two things had to happen at the same time. First, we streamlined our construction-approval process to make it more responsive and faster but still retain General Officer oversight. I was given the authority at the G.O. level, as well. Second, we were given the authority to coordinate directly with more units outside III Corps, MNC-I.  This was a big deal but came with additional responsibilities like keeping our chain-of-command informed (through a two-star liaison from MNC-I’s HQ).

We added Living Support Areas (LSAs) and Tactical Operations Centers (TOCs) to our construction priority list but with the assumption that none would be permanent buildings. Tentage would be the primary source of lodging, followed by renovated existing structures. TOCs would be in some form of structure, either concrete or a thin-skinned trailer. General O asked me for a list of potential locations he could send the incoming BCTs, the final location determined by potential threat and ability of Iraqi forces. His primary goal was not to reduce sectarian violence, per se, but as a subset of protecting the population in the Baghdad area. General O’s insights on our mission was correct, given that appropriately 3,000 Iraqis were being killed each month.

We were getting good progress on building Dining Facilities and power distribution efforts. Nevertheless, we modified our construction priorities to reflect these changes and include additional guidance from General O. I had been telling him that we could achieve his goals but it would require considerable reduction in additional inessential capabilities like Moral Welfare and Recreation (MWR) locations. He agreed but wanted these added back into our priorities. Here is our modified construction priorities list that would largely remain unchanged from this point in late January of 2007 to when I departed months later:

1. LSAs (billeting)
2. TOCs and Command and Control (C2)
3. Medical Hospitals and treatment
4. Ammunition Storage
5. Detainee enclosures
6. Power
7. Water
8. Waste Water
9. Solid Waste Disposal and Incinerators
10. Laundry Pickup and Dropoff
11. MWR basic facilities

Low on our priority list would be any future project that could be delayed without jeopardizing already approved funding or unnecessary increasing costs. This included bus shelters, additional MWR improvements, and Reconstruction (Iraqi projects).

Late January was when I was blindsided by a piece of crucial information brought to me by an Engineer heavy-haul Soldier. He told me that the Main Supply Route (MSR) from Kuwait into Baghdad – MSR Aspen – couldn’t accommodate two heavy haulers passing side by side going different directions. That was nuts. How could it be that we had rebuilt this supply route and many of our vehicles were too wide to pass one another?  Looking into this problem I found that the U.S. Corps of Engineers had reduced the roadway width due to costs. I am sure someone high up had approved this change but I was not aware. When I told our MNF-I Logistics folks, they nearly blew a gasket.

I sent one of my Air Force Civil Engineers out by helicopter with priority directions to hop a mile at a time and inspect MSR Aspen. When he returned, he confirmed the roadway was too narrow and to make things worse, the edges of it were crumbling due to a failure to correctly prepare the roadway bed. Over time, this meant the roadway would narrow as it decayed. I requested that the Loggies at MNF-I begin the work to submit a plan to either expand the road or find an alternative solution.  Eventually they determined we could build turnouts faster and cheaper and not rebuild the road. This was a good solution but would take lots of time we didn’t have.

Our Engineers were not working alone on these issues. LTC Andy Knight at U.S. Army Central (or Third Army, called ARCENT) was a real goldmine of information and influence. Him and his team helped us with much of the paperwork.  We were also helping U.S. staff at Multi-National Security Transition Command (MNSTC-I); a training and support command assisting the Iraqi military and police. When they could, they would help us too. I also found some help in a few General Officers at MNC-I, like BG Neil Braverstock, an Australian.

We were still getting fast-paced requests that added friction to our main mission. For example, on the 26th of January, we were tasked to construct four or five 1,000 detainee Hasty Compounds within 30 days. Also additional improvements to guard towers and lighting “outside the wire” so our guards had better visibility. And, of course, the enemy “has a vote” and we were getting an increase in mortar and rocket fire. This got everyone excited and wanting more Overhead Protection.

That same evening, we had a memorial service for those killed in the helicopter shoot down.

And, we were told not to call this increase in troops a “Surge” but to call it a “Plus-Up.”  Looking back on the Surge many years later, this was a silly thing to do.

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Please read my books:

1. “55 Rules for a Good Life,” on Amazon (link here).
2. “Our Longest Year in Iraq,” on Amazon (link here).