Iraq War Pre-Surge: Planning & Priorities

[February 19, 2025]  It was time for our Engineers to get to work. We’d received approval from “General O” ( LTG Ray Odierno) to move forward with the hard planning necessary to accommodate the incoming Surge. By this time in the war, the U.S. government had agreed to follow both the rules, guidelines, and standards of both the new government of Iraq and the U.S.  While that sounds good on paper and looks like the logical thing to do – our Department of State was happy – making this work was nearly impossible.

We were also tasked with improving general security and protection. For example, the military was sending us C-RAMs to install on the larger coalition military bases. This system was the 20mm land-based Phalanx Weapons system used for automatic weapon close-in detection and destruction of incoming mortars, artillery, and rockets. We were further ordered to devise improvements to guard towers to make them less susceptible to small arms and RPG fire. Fortunately, the C-3 Operations staff had a physical security section, and they were able to assist our Engineers.

Not all of our Engineer efforts in preparing for the Surge were directed toward military matters. We also had the mission to support Iraqi civilian economic zones. This meant that many projects would be generated by what the Iraqis wanted. Our C-9 Civil-Military Operations staff helped with this. We were about to enter one of the biggest buildups in our history since the Korean War, and the directive to accommodate Iraqi civilian desires into our plans was going to be a speed bump to our preparation for our expanding warfighting effort.

Here’s how I handled this. The C-9 himself and I agreed that he would keep the Iraqis happy if I promised to utilize Iraqi civilian contractors as much as possible, barring potential security issues. This was a good compromise.  I agreed with his proposal. We were also eager to get more Iraqi contractors vetted anyway. We desperately needed the manpower, and although the average Iraqi worker was unskilled, uneducated, and inefficient, they were loyal, hard-working, willing to learn new construction skills, and generally had a positive disposition.

We also had an ace up our sleeves, so to speak. An Iraqi architect named Dr. Jamal, whom I knew from my previous deployment a year earlier. He had been one of Saddam Hussein’s chief architects before we invaded Iraq in 2003 and was highly skilled.  Dr. Jamal also could quickly hire hundreds of semi-skilled Iraqis, engineers, and religious leaders (who would keep their tribe members placated). He would be our go-between as a businessman running an Iraq-American joint venture. And he had important connections with the new Iraqi government.

There would be four main sources that made sure we had the proper facilities for the incoming Surge. The largest in numbers were the Iraqis themselves, who appreciated any chance to earn hard currency. The most skilled, efficient, and reliable were non-Iraq professional companies from all over the world, mostly from Kuwait, Turkey, South Africa, and Syria. And there was the ongoing American contractor KBR, which technically could not do “construction” but could renovate and repair existing facilities. Lastly, we had American military Engineers (mostly Army and Air Force) who were also used for quality control and assurance and who could be fast to engage or redirect.

Plans and priorities were developed that were as good and as fast as planning can be, and not yet knowing where all the surge BCTs would be located General O. This meant a heavy reliance initially on reconnaissance by myself and parts of my team. Unlike my first combat tour, where I traveled by convoy, I’d now travel by helicopter, a faster and safer method.

Our construction priority overall would be:

1. Billets (including troop space, heat/AC, safety, and force protection)
2. Tactical Operation Centers, Offices, and Administrative/Logistical Centers
3. Dining Facilities
4. Water (access, purification, bottling, and delivery)
5. Waste Water (removal and security)
6. Power (electricity generation and distribution) and to users
7. Motor Pool Space
8. Force Protection overall

Any other facility requested by a unit that did not appear on this list had to be both justified in writing and approved at the Division level. If a commander at a lower-level unit could verbally justify a need to me, and we had the time and materials, I had the authority to approve it myself. This gave us flexibility in our construction effort. And, there were priorities within these priorities. An example would be a request for a hasty helipad or a new road which could be fairly easy.

What we would soon discover is a shortage of quality construction materials (lumber, cement, electrical wiring and components, etc.) would slow us down. Also, there was no way to bump up our power generation capability quickly. Although large generator purchasing was centralized, we still found ourselves competing against ourselves as units attempted to purchase the same items we controlled. This is why we had a central system, to begin with. Our C-4 logisticians were pulling their hair out over this. This meant we sometimes purchased lesser-quality materials, and that meant either over-designing and building to compensate or suffering with a greater failure rate.

A problem I stumbled upon involved the leasing of facilities, including Dining Facilities and power plants. Clearly, those who originally approved leasing as a way of circumventing U.S. legal Military Construction (MILCON) spending limits did not anticipate us staying in Iraq for as long as we were. In my opinion, the legal issues were mostly ignored. But the problem was massive and was not going away. There would become a point where the U.S. Congress would have to get involved. The timing was bad. We were already stretched thin and in gross violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act.

Later, I’ll discuss how this was fixed. For now, we had our hands full assisting U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) with flushing out “Surge” standards, bringing in additional firefighting teams, locating Overhead Cover, dealing with a difficult Department of State, building concrete barriers and other “hardening” efforts. And I had to continue to fend off a gaggle of General Officers who believed I worked for them.

One bit of good news was that on 20 January 2007, I was finally given the names of the incoming BCTs. This gave me the ability to plan for finer numbers of personnel and equipment. For example, a Light Infantry Brigade is configured differently from a Stryker Brigade. But it was the level of bureaucracy that often frustrated me the most. I know about how the Army bureaucracy can stymie any good plan and I was determined not to let that happen. Feed the beast and you might survive to fight another day. So, I fed the beast.

This was a good time to be in the position I was in. By this point, I’d been in Iraq earlier for a full-year tour and was now in Iraq for an additional six months. I knew all the key players, the bureaucracy, and key commanders, and how to get the money and materials for construction. And, best of all, I had the approval by General O to “move out, get ‘er done!”

Perfect. Now, plan hard, engineer right, protect our workers, do recon, and communicate and coordinate.

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Please read my books:

1. “55 Rules for a Good Life,” on Amazon (link here).
2. “Our Longest Year in Iraq,” on Amazon (link here).