Iraq War Pre-Surge: Supply Delays

[April 13, 2025]  Was there ever a battle or war that was won without supplies?  Our Army was fortunate to have some of the nation’s best logisticians, always ensuring the fighters had what they needed. But, like in all wars, nothing is easy and in the Iraq War, we were experiencing critical supply problems as we prepared our Pre-Surge construction efforts. The problem was there was not enough “logistics throughput” – meaning trucks and aircraft – to get us everything we needed when we needed it. This meant that those supplies prioritized Class I, III, and V were the classic high priority (food & water, fuel & lubricants, and ammunition). Without these, you cannot fight. My problem was that construction materials were Class X and one of the lowest priorities.

The fact that a major construction effort was needed to prepare the battlefield for inbound units was not lost on General O because I briefed him. To solve the problem, I was given an Infantry Task Force to guard several Class X convoys. When I woke up in late March to a clear, mild-temperature morning just before sunrise, I knew this had to be solved today. In a discussion with GEN Petraeus, he asked what the impact would be of a shortage of Class X materials on his new strategy.  I told him the problem wasn’t having enough supplies or transportation, per se, but that those supplies were in Kuwait, and we didn’t have enough PSD security to escort the supply trucks up north to Baghdad. Our construction for his troops would slow to a grinding halt.

Butler Range was largely under control at this point, and the 411th would solve the many problems (like UXO on the base), physical security, logistics, and managing the various Army and Air Force Engineer units. I’d asked the 411th Engineer Brigade Commander, Brig. Gen. Mike Silva to assign his Deputy, COL Jeff Elam to be the main POC for Besmaya. Jeff was an excellent choice. However, our preparation to receive other large combat units was suffering from shortages.  We had other problems. For example, Taji would be our northernmost military base in the Baghdad AOR and would accommodate a large troop expansion, given all the available land area. There were old lessons learned; the main one here is that anybody can talk tactics without getting the logistics right.

The purpose of all this preparation was to house incoming BCTs that had the job of “kicking Al Qaeda’s ass.”  We had fancy names for this strategy, but taking the fight to the enemy was what we had to do. I had an interesting conversation with GEN. Petraeus at the end of March 2007. I’m paraphrasing here a bit and throwing in my two cents worth.

“An interesting sociological phenomenon that we are seeing is that it is easy for AQI (Al Qaeda) to operate in richer, more educated areas of Baghdad as compared to other areas of average citizens. It is easier to control a rich, educated population. We also know that the university and other schools in the city are easily intimidated and bullied. Girl schools are attacked, yes, but what is surprising to me is that the rich and educated have failed to stand up against terrorism. — COL Doug Satterfield notebook 4 of 5, pages 60-61

While reading about Engineer mission challenges, it’s easy to forget that we were still in a fighting war, and the point of bringing in these BCTs was to quell the heightened violence.  Our Engineers were not complacent, a dangerous mindset to avoid.  Often it was the case that our Soldiers were operating on small bases without dedicated security. This means we – us Engineers – were the force protection, which also cut down on our ability to do our Engineer missions. On the last day of March, several of our C-7 Engineers had their living quarters hit with rockets. It was “interesting,” according to one of our Majors.  I think he meant something a little different, but it was a wake-up call. Only a few days before, our troops discovered a “torture chamber” in a Sunni Mosque, plus a large cache of explosives. And yet, we’re not allowed in mosques.

There were several large projects, each costing more than $50 million each. I’m not sure how cost-effective they were, but, at the time, we thought they made sense by saving lives. One was the Baghdad Bypass. At the time, all our convoys headed north went through the city instead of around it. A ring road had been in the early city planning, so we could actually see this area – no building was allowed in the corridor. I had less than 24 hours to put together a briefing for Congress. MIT would later be approved. Another was the Overhead Cover (OHC) project, funded for over $200 million. This was a way to put a barrier over the top of “soft” inhabited areas like Dining Facilities, PXs, gymnasiums, and other high-occupancy structures.

The bureaucracy and supply shortages continued to drag us down at every opportunity, and we fought it with a real determination not to let down the warfighter.

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Please read my books:

1. “55 Rules for a Good Life,” on Amazon (link here).
2. “Our Longest Year in Iraq,” on Amazon (link here).