Iraq War Pre-Surge: USAID

[March 3, 2025]  It was late January of 2007 and tensions were running high in the Iraq War. Our Engineers were working all out and the pressure to ready facilities for incoming American troops was enormous. Fortunately, we weren’t the only element in-country that we had on our side. MNF-I was a full partner, as were a variety of NGOs, USAID, and several large American logistics firms like KBR, Flour, and DynCorp International which operated under the U.S. Army’s LOGCAP III contract. Similar to LOGCAP, the U.S. Air Force had a smaller contracting program called AFCAP. There was concern about proper oversight and rightly so. As the lead facilities engineer, I was responsible to ensure all these entities were tied in with us and synchronized.

MNC-I (Corps level) Engineers were one of the major organizations for Construction and Reconstruction efforts in-country for the war. I was the senior Engineer for all our construction efforts, meaning any engineering project “inside the wire” or those that helped the U.S. military and our coalition partners. This is why my office was a hotbed of activity of planning, analyzing engineering intelligence, providing guidance, and directing subordinate engineering units (through our commander). In this capacity, USAID came to me to keep us informed and, most needed, to assist them.

I was also acting as the MNC-I Reconstruction officer (a critical vacancy), meaning I was also responsible for MNC-I’s American-centric construction that was “outside the wire” engineering that was to help the Iraqi government and its citizens. Reconstruction was a complex, high-visibility, often frustrating effort because of the involvement of so many different government agencies, outside organizations, and political International inputs. Because my staff and I were working hard to get pre-surge projects on-track and coordinated, we sometimes were not as focused on the reconstruction effort.

Reconstruction was a lower priority at MNC-I because we had the immediate kinetic mission to fight the insurgents and terrorists. This is why USAID was talking to us. Their message to us was that their task was to engage Iraqis at all levels in order to meet the intent of MNF-I Commander’s intent (GEN Casey).  This was part of Casey’s “Clear, Hold, Build” strategy. GEN Casey was the top commander, so ignoring his intent would be not just unprofessional but also counterproductive in the long term. He had insights that we could not even imagine. I was onboard, of course.

It was time to acknowledge the Reconstruction effort and bring in another full Colonel to fill the position which I was attempting to do part time and not as successfully as I should. This U.S. Army colonel was selected and sent to us. When he arrived in Kuwait, he called to let me know that he would be there for two weeks to “acclimate and train.”  He already had a combat tour in Iraq so I told him to take the next flight north to Baghdad, no excuses. “Consider that an order,” I said. He ignored me initially. After a week in Kuwait, he flew north to finally take his place.  Shockingly, he went missing. By the time he called me more than a week later, he said that he had “toured” Iraq and was ready to come to work.  I had him immediately fired (by the C-7 himself) and returned to the states. We would not tolerate someone who disobeys me or anyone and was willing to disregard directives. This put us in a bind but better than having a renegade running about.

USAID should have been a godsend to us. It was run by experienced, professional Americans. As a side note, Americans and our English-speaking partners were trustworthy (with rare exceptions).  We had two simple rules. The first was to never trust an Iraqi. Always verify everything from an Iraqi, check everything they tell you, and never trust them with your life or with the lives of others. They might be honest and good individuals but we had no way of knowing for sure. The second rule was anyone working with us had to prove they were willing to work hard, keep us informed, provide good leadership, and be clear about their capabilities and resources. I had been told that USAID was doing great work in Iraq, working at the highest levels in the Iraqi government and at the Provincial level.

As the acting Reconstruction officer, I met with Kent Larson from USAID on January 28 to discuss what they wanted to do. He was the director of the USAID/Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Team Office in Baghdad.  He would do a great job getting together with the multitude of Iraqis from all walks of life and to establish a list of things they needed. The problem I had was that his folks could not provide projects to the local level. He had resolved many big problems in the Baghdad AO at higher levels, but we at MNC-I were just not part of the equation. While my experience with USAID was limited, they did have the support of senior Flag Officers like BG Vincent Brooks, who later became one of America’s most famous Generals.

Soldiers at these PRTs regularly complained to me that USAID personnel were poor at follow through, were afraid of going “outside the wire” to meet directly with Iraqis, and they were often so green that they were worthless in the combat zone. BG Brooks and his team were able to help them streamline USAID’s processes and educate them on how to better work with the combat forces – that’s us – from MNC-I. Brooks was one of those generals that was best at being in the role of mediator and it worked. His smooth demeanor, patience, and tact went a long way towards the ultimate success of USAID in Iraq. And, yes, they were successful.

USAID’s success can be attributed to many factors. One of the most important factors was learning enough of the U.S.military culture to operate with us. But, I didn’t think at the time that they had sufficient trained staff. In a meeting with General O, I mentioned that USAID needed to send their projects to us for review. This is how synchronization of effort works.  I’m sure they got the word because I started to receive possible projects at my office, although the descriptions were light on details and with boilerplate justifications.  It would take them months to learn to work with us better. The good news is they had the funds to do any work they wanted, a rare position to be in.

Many have written about the great successes of USAID in Iraq, in particular during these years, 2006-2007. I’ve read many articles published in open media about the tremendous effort in “winning the hearts and minds” of the Iraqi citizenry during the “Surge.”  I’m sure that is true. But I never personally saw anything of value.

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Please read my books:

1. “55 Rules for a Good Life,” on Amazon (link here).
2. “Our Longest Year in Iraq,” on Amazon (link here).