Why Arabs Lose Wars

[September 29, 2024]  A long-running theme in the analysis of how poorly Middle Eastern militaries performed on the battlefield is reviewed in an article by Norvell de Atkine titled Why Arabs Lose Wars.  The most common reason given is culture, but de Atkine believes such thinking can lead to false conclusions.

“As these examples suggest, when culture is considered in calculating the relative strengths and weaknesses of opposing forces, it tends to lead to wild distortions, especially when it is a matter of understanding why states unprepared for war enter into combat flushed with confidence.  The temptation is to impute cultural attributes to the enemy state that negate its superior numbers or weaponry.  Or the opposite: to view the potential enemy through the prism of one’s own cultural norms.”

Further, when considering the past performance of a military is also fraught with danger because societies evolve, and so does their military subculture.  So, what can explain why Arabs lose wars?  And we have to acknowledge this idea is a highly generalized statement.

Yet, the role of culture must be taken into account.  As John Keegan argues, early Arab armies were masters at “evasion, delay, and indirection” and not the “face-to-face” style of European warfare.  T.E. Lawrence called this “winning wars without battles.”  There are certainly identifiable patterns that contribute to the poor performance of Arab armies and air forces.

Such patterns include “over-centralization, discouraging initiative, lack of flexibility, manipulation of information, and the discouragement of leadership at the junior officer level.”  We do not, however, integrate this study of culture into our modern Western style of warfare and thus are less likely to be prepared to fight against an Arab military force on our terms.

So what does de Atkine recommend we do to understand better how Arab culture affects their fighting capabilities?

1. Arabs hold information closely and thus are examples of “information is power,” and the lack of shared information explains an uninformed military. From the lowest to the highest military personnel, they husband their knowledge, and once they give it to others, he has now lost his power over others.
2. Arab military training is often unimaginative and not challenging. The Arab system of education is based on rote memorization and they do that very well.  But this means there is a lesser ability to reason or conduct an analysis based upon general military principles.  Further, head-to-head competition is avoided for it means someone wins and another loses.  This is especially true in mixed ranks.  Arabs are highly sensitive to “humiliation.”
3. Arab senior leaders are the weakest link in their militaries. They are not trained or encouraged to seek the initiative or be flexible on the battlefield.  This may be the result of a class system like a caste layering in their society.  While the lower-ranking soldiers are treated poorly and this is reflected in their hatred of the military itself and poor discipline.  Such a circumstance shows its weakness in the vast difference between the enlisted and officer corps.  There is a high price to pay for this in combat, where stress is high.
4. Decisions are highly centralized and rarely delegated. “Rarely does an officer make a critical decision on his own; instead, he prefers the safe course of being identified as industrious, intelligent, loyal and compliant.”  Being an innovator or making independent decisions is a recipe for trouble.  Orders flow from the top to the bottom and are not to be interpreted, amended, or modified.
5. A lack of combined arms operations. The lack of trust among Arabs in those outside their own families encourages the tendency to not work with others, not to trust those outside their sphere of influence, and not care for them or what they are doing.  They are more interested in protecting their unit rather than their mission.  The use of sectarian and tribal loyalties exacerbates this.  “No Arab will allow combined operations or training to become routine, for these create familiarity, soften rivalries, erase suspicions, and eliminate the fragmented, competing organizations that enable rulers to play off rivals against one another.”
6. Overclassification of routine information. This feeds the divisive and compartmentalization of their military forces.  There is an obsession with security.  Arabs are hyper-sensitive about Israel’s Mossad and are therefore not going to share information with Western militaries who have any relationship with Israel.
7. A laxness with respect to safety measures and indifference to accidents. Perhaps this is a part of the inherent fatalism within Islam or political culture.  Often, the higher political leaders lack concern for their soldiers and this attitude filters downward through the ranks.

“It would be difficult to exaggerate the cultural gulf separating American and Arab military cultures.  In every significant area, American military advisors find students who enthusiastically take in their lessons and then resolutely fail to apply them.  The culture they return to — the culture of their armies in their own countries — defeats the intentions with which they took leave of their American instructors.”

De Atkine does not see this changing any time in the near future, and the Arab culture will thus continue to have negative consequences on the battlefield.  Until a change is made at the most fundamental levels, Arabs will continue to lose wars.  To overcome this cultural drag on their military requires indoctrinating trust, respect, and openness at all levels.  They don’t want to hear this, and thus, little will change in the near future.

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1. “55 Rules for a Good Life,” on Amazon (link here).
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